Map of the Nile river system – Wikimedia Commons
A recent documentary on Al Jazeera English covered an interesting issue, that of usage rights to the waters of the Nile river system.
Nile water usage rights are complex, due to the river system encompassing many different countries, and also many different climatic zones, from equatorial rainforests through to hyper-arid hot desert. Rights to water usage are currently based on two agreements, the 1929 agreement (“Nile Water Agreement”) led by the British and Egyptian governments, and the 1959 agreement (“Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile”) between Egypt and Sudan. Both of these agreements are contentious amongst the “Upper Nile” states (i.e. those to the south of Sudan, plus Ethiopia) as neither agreement makes any provision for any nation except Egypt and Sudan in access to water. The 1929 agreement goes even further, in that it grants Egypt ultimate authority over Nile water usage, allowing Egypt to monitor any water extraction activities by other Nilotic states, and to veto any upstream dam projects (with the exception of a specific allocation to Sudan, drawn outside of the minimum flow period)
In recent years the upstream states, led by Ethiopia (by far the biggest and most powerful of the upstream states, and with aspirations to be the wider regional powerbroker) has challenged the legal foundation of the agreements, claiming that they are a colonial relic, and thus invalid. It is argued that the time of both agreements, many of the upstream states were either subject to direct colonial occupation, or had puppet states or suzerains forced upon them. These administrations, the upstream states argue, failed to defend their interests, against those of the colonial regimes (primarily British) whose own interests dictated that most water go to Egypt to drive her massive cotton and sugar industries, which kept sure and steady supply of raw materials to European industrial interests. To press their claims, these states formed the Nile Basin Initiative, and invited Sudan and Egypt to take part, to negotiate a new treaty that allocates water to the upstream states, and also aims to establish a framework to harness more of the basins water supplies. Egypt has responded by refusing to sign any new agreements, and defending the existing acts, insisting that negotiation may only proceed on the basis of dealing with “green water” (rainfall entering the Nile system) completely separately to Egypt’s existing allocation, which would not be touched.
However, this has now been thrown into chaos by the imminent arrival on the scene of a completely new upstream state, South Sudan.
Firstly, South Sudan can legitimately and reasonably claim not to be subject to any existing treaty, as the state is an entirely new creation. It was not only not properly represented in prior acts by silence on the part of puppet or colonial governments, but literally was not in existence, with not even a “colonial stooge” at the table to represent them. Furthermore, the entry of this new state onto game board can be pointed to by both South Sudan, and other upstream nations, as making the forming of a new treaty essential, otherwise, South Sudan would be technically free to do anything with the river it pleased, being bound by no treaty.
Secondly, South Sudan’s relations with the North are unlikely to be good, given recent events in Abyei province, on the soon-to-be border with the north, and the decades long conflict between the two nations. Thus, the south may regard allying with other upstream states in demanding a new treaty as a good way of pressuring Sudan (who like Egypt, rejects the reviewing of existing arrangements) into concessions on issues like Abyei and access to oil refining and export facilities in the north, upon which the south is dependent for its economic survival.
Thirdly, once the South does secede from Sudan “proper”, this may trigger a crisis in the north, possibly bringing down the government, Egypt’s key, and indeed, only, regional ally in its aggressive “just say no” position.
Finally, Egypt is very much trapped between a rock and a hard place. Egypt is under increasing pressure to agree to negotiating a new treaty, but in practical terms, cannot afford to do so.
Lake Nasser at New Kalabsha Island, Egypt – photo by the author
On the first issue, although the South demanding a new treaty gives an additional lever to the upstream nations to apply against Egypt (and Sudan), it is unlikely to make much difference. Egypt has successfully managed to not blink first in previous challenges, and in real terms there is actually not a great deal the South can do to actively interfere with current usage patterns. The course of the river through the South is predominantly flat swampland, with pastoral grazing as the main non-oil related economic activity. Large dam construction here would be almost impossible, and there is no need nor any supporting infrastructure with which to back up such a project. However, one ace the South does have is its ability to scupper Egypt’s current negotiating position of maintaining the current allocations, and co-operating to increase Nile flow, and distributing the benefits of the new flow more “equitably”. The biggest increase to the Nile flow, and those only clear and easy way of doing so, is by construction of a new main channel for the White Nile to divert it from the Sudd swamplands. Approx. 20bln m3 of White Nile water is lost to the swamps each year through evaporation (compared to the total annual allocation to Egypt of 55.5bln m3). Diverting it would release much of that water into the lower river system, where it can be used productively, or so the theory goes. Such a scheme was started in the 1970s, known as the Jonglei canal. However, the population of the South is against the scheme, fearing it will turn the swamps, on which they graze cattle, into desert, and that the project was an attempt at Egypto-Sudanese colonisation of the South. The SPLA, one of the main political forces in the South, targeted (and completely halted) early work on the project at the beginning of the 2nd north-south war. As such, not only can the South block the only real way to significantly increase Nile flow, but has done so before, and can do so again. Thus, the South could effectively block any attempt at renegotiation that includes Egypt on terms it can accept.
This leads us in the second point. The south is vulnerable to northern pressure on its oil industry. The south is landlocked, and the export pipelines at present all run north through Sudan “proper” to the Red Sea coast. In addition, most of the refining capacity for Sudanese oil lies in the north. Given that the South has no other significant source of income, and given the aforementioned craptastic relations between the two, then no one would be surprised if the South uses all the levers at its disposal to ensure that it gets the access it needs to these facilities. And, the biggest lever it has is the ability to block projects like Jonglei that both Egypt and Sudan need in order to both exploit their existing allocations, and free up “spare” water to use as in negotiating a new settlement. The south is doubtless also aware that the Egyptians will likely hold the North responsible for “reigning in” any Southern action, possibly including the latter using its “new state” status to put pressure on Egypt and Sudan to join the NBI bandwagon. The south also knows just how dependent the north is on good relations with Egypt. If it were not for the latter’s sheltering of the north from the full force of the west, in return for toeing the line on the Nile, a peaceful southern frontier, and forgetting about the Halib triangle dispute. Omar Bahsir has doubtlessly had a good run. If it were not for Egypt, he would already be well used to Dutch prison food.
Which leads into a quiet concern, but one that is doubtlessly very prominent in the minds of Egypt’s strategic thinkers – the collapse of Northern Sudan. When the South secedes, the North will be deprived of a significant chunk of income, and also a significant amount of her strategic worth to China, whom has bankrolled the north for some time, as well as providing the technology and expertise necessary to develop the oil industry and military. It is no secret that this is in exchange for a guaranteed flow of oil back to China. With much of that oil now lying in the South, the North may well find the cash pipeline shut off, or at least much reduced, and the many of the engineers packing up their tools and jumping on a plane to Juba. It is for precisely this reason that the North was fought so long and hard to prevent the South from separating in the first place. Egypt is doubtlessly aware of the fact, but has limited options. There is little money to throw at the problem, and the oft repeated rhetoric about a military solution to defending water rights is precisely that, rhetoric. There is little appetite either in Egypt or amongst her Western friends for the government to make good on said rhetoric, and it is doubtful in any event that the military could sustain such a stabilisation or “nation building” exercise for any length of time, especially in a nation which has a (very, very) long and troubled history of Egyptian military intervention.
As a result of all these factors, it would seem that Egypt is left with few alternatives to joining the table at the NBI, and agree to negotiate a new water usage agreement that covers all the Nilotic states. However, Egypt is backed into a corner domestically. With its current Nile allocation of 55.5bln m3, and just1.3bln m3 from other sources, Egyptian water resources total around 860m3 per capita per annum (putting it well into “water scarce” territory), and with population growth (and depleted fossil water resources) factored in, this is forecast to drop to 600m3 within 15 years. The Nile allocation represents some 96% of total Egyptian water resources. Clearly, then, Egypt is in no position to relinquish any of its rights to Nile water. Also, it is clear that in order to meet the future needs of her population and agriculture, Egypt needs to drastically increase both the amount of available water, and the efficiency with which it is used, particularly in regards to agricultural use.
The only realistic way to increase available resources is to get the Jonglei canal project back on track. This means engagement with South Sudan, and that will only be possible if Egypt can offer the South something in return. Given that the South is largely dependent on oil income alone, which generates revenue but little employment or development potential, and given the lack of money Egypt can put on the table, two possibilities present themselves. Firstly, making it clear that the Jonglei project will mean more water overall. Whilst pressing hard for Jonglei, she should also find a natural alliance with South Sudan in giving them a voice in the NWI and other regional bodies, and in pushing for South Sudan to get its own dedicated allocation of surplus Nile water sufficient to allow for agricultural development, in return for South Sudan defending Egypt’s current rights, the Jonglei project, and an additional Egyptian allocation from the Jonglei water.
Secondly, Egypt can offer South Sudan advisers and engineering expertise in developing her agriculture, a potential source of significant employment and alternate revenue stream. Egyptian investors have made headway in establishing agricultural ventures in Sudan in recent years, developing farmland to produce crops for export back to Egypt. Utilising this experience for both domestic and Egyptian production would be of significant value to South Sudan, which is experiencing an influx of returnees from the north, but has few jobs or resources with which to absorb them.
At the same time, Egypt also needs to drastically increase domestic water efficiency. Agriculture accounts for over 80% of Egyptian water consumption. The vast majority of Egyptian fields are still irrigated by perennial irrigation. Drip irrigation, which can potentially reduce water usage by as much as 70%, is extremely rare, and is confined almost entirely to the largest and most industrialised farms on new land. Introducing this technology to small farms on old land could free up a massive amount of water. In addition, realigning agricultural policy away from water intensive crops such as sugar to “dry” crops such as wheat would allow for additional water savings, as well as providing greater food security for Egypt.
The challenges facing Egypt, both diplomatically in defending her essential interests, as well as domestically in introducing new technologies with potentially high financial and political costs is daunting. However, the existing policy of stonewalling the upstream countries so long as the status quo can endure may no longer be an option. South Sudan will soon become a fact, a political reality that Cairo will have to engage with, like it or not. Similarly, Egyptians are going to continue to farm the land, drink water, and have children. Cairo needs to win the argument that the basic rhythm of life in the provinces can only continue if entrenched practices of irrigation out in the governates can change.
Such challenges can be met. The current climate of relative openness, engagement and unity between the government and the people is a once in a lifetime opportunity to address an issue as deeply emotional as it is complex, and secure a lasting victory for Egypt. A victory that guarantees her rights to the Nile, the long term security of the agricultural heartland, and a diplomatic victory in the upper Nile basin.
Tags: 1929 Agreement, 1959 Agreement, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Egypt, Egypt-Sudan relations, egyptian politics, Egyptian water rights, Ethiopia, Jonglei Canal, Nasser, Nile, Nile Basin, Nile Basin Initiative, Nile water usage, Nile water usage rights, Nile Waters Agreement, Nile Waters Initiative, Omar Bashir, South Sudan, SPLA, Sudan, Sudanese politics, Water rights, water security, White Nile
